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Washington, DC’s public charter school movement was billed as a promising 
alternative to the struggling District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS). The District is 
over twenty years into its public charter school experiment, and evidence suggests public 
charter schools are performing no better than DCPS. Reading and math proficiency, 
graduation, dropout, and college enrollment rates all indicate that public charter high 
schools are not sufficiently educating their students. The DC Public Charter School 
Board, the sole authorizer of the city’s public charter schools, uses an academic 
accountability policy known as the Performance Management Framework (PMF) to 
assess school quality. The most recent PMF identifies half of the District’s public charter 
high schools as high-performing, despite evidence demonstrating schools’ weaknesses. 
This capstone project proposes a PMF policy amendment designed to improve the 
Board’s ability to identify public charter high school deficiencies. The amended PMF 
policy could spur programmatic adjustments at the school-level, potentially resulting in 
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TO: Scott Pearson, Executive Director, DC Public Charter School Board 
 
FROM: Melodi Sampson 
SUBJECT: Recommendation to Amend the DC Public Charter School Board’s High 
School Accountability Policy 
 
DATE: May 7, 2019  
I. Action-Forcing Event 
In January 2019, the DC Public Charter School Board (DC PCSB) voted to close 
one of its 19 public charter high schools because of unsatisfactory academic performance. 
During the same period, another public charter high school relinquished its charter (again, 
because of unsatisfactory academic performance), and a public charter school serving 
middle and high schoolers announced plans to close one of its campuses. These decisions 
will result in school disruptions for nearly 1,000 public charter high school students. 1 
These closures have sparked criticism of the District’s public charter high schools and 
DC PCSB’s high school accountability policy.  
II. Statement of Problem 
Washington, DC’s public charter high schools are not sufficiently educating their 
students, and DC PCSB’s high school accountability policy does not adequately report 
DC public charter high schools’ deficiencies. The tables below, produced by the DC 
Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE), display high school Partnership 
for Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers (PARCC) data for school years 
                                               
1Perry Stein, “‘It’s absolutely terrible’: When a Charter School Closes, What Happens to the Kids,” The 





2016-2017 and 2017-2018.2,3 During these school years, fewer than a third of DC public 
charter high school students were proficient in English language arts (ELA) and math.4 
More specifically, in school year 2017-2018, 25.8 percent of DC public charter high 
school students met or exceeded PARCC ELA expectations, while 12.2 percent of DC 
public charter high school students met or exceeded PARCC math expectations. While 
the data show year-to-year improvement, this progress is modest. Furthermore, DC’s 
traditional public school system posted greater gains in ELA and math than the public 
charter school sector for the past two school years.5 As discussed in the 
“History/Background” section below, this is noteworthy because the District’s public 
charter schools were promoted as a promising alternative to the traditional public school 
system that struggled to serve its students.  




                                               
2 OSSE, “DC's 2018 PARCC Results,” August 16, 2018, 
https://osse.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/osse/page_content/attachments/2018%20PARCC%20Results
%20Release%20%28Aug.%2016%2C%202018%29.pdf. 
3 These images show DC-wide PARCC performance, public charter PARCC performance, and traditional 
public school  PARCC performance. The term “4+” refers to PARCC scoring: students who earn a four or 
higher on the PARCC are identified as meeting or exceeding expectations.  
4 OSSE, “DC's 2018 PARCC Results.” 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid.  
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Table 2. PARCC Math Results for DC High Schoolers at Public Charter Schools and 
Traditional Public Schools 7  
 
Washington, DC’s public charter high school graduation rates are further 
evidence the charter sector is not sufficiently serving its students. Per OSSE, the school 
year 2017-2018 charter sector graduation rate was 72.4 percent, down from 73.8 percent 
the previous school year.8 The average charter graduation rate across school years 2014-
2015 through 2017-2018 is 72.2 percent. Given earlier comparisons between DC’s public 
charter high schools and the city’s traditional public high schools, it is worth noting DC 
public charter high schools have a slightly higher graduation rate than the traditional 
schools. In school year 2016-2017, public charter schools’ graduation rate was 0.6 
percent higher than the traditional schools’ graduation rate. In school year 2017-2018, 
public charter schools’ graduation rate was 3.8 percent higher than the traditional 
schools’ graduation rate.9 Nevertheless, the charter sector’s graduation rate is 
                                               
7 Ibid.  
8 OSSE, “High School Graduation Rates,” accessed February 19, 2019, https://osse.dc.gov/service/high-
school-graduation-rates-0.  
9 Ibid.  
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significantly lower than the national graduation rate. The national graduation rate was 
84.6 percent at the end of school year 2016-2017 (the most recent year for which data are 
available).10  
When students reach the fourth year of high school and do not graduate, they may 
feel discouraged, losing the will to complete school altogether. As a result, low 
graduation rates give way to high dropout rates. At the end of school year 2017-2018, 
14.0 percent of public charter high school students (who completed four years of high 
school) were identified as “educationally disengaged,” meaning they did not graduate and 
are not currently enrolled in school.11 For perspective, the national dropout rate was 6.0 
percent in 2016.12 These figures demonstrate that the District’s high school charter sector 
is underperforming. 
DC public charter school graduates’ college enrollment rates also reveal the city’s 
public charter schools are not sufficiently serving their students. The table below reports 
college enrollment data (for the years 2014 through 2016) the National Student 
Clearinghouse released to DC PCSB.13  
Table 3. DC Public Charter School Graduates and College Enrollment Rates 14 
Year Number of DC 
Public Charter 
School Graduates 
Number of DC Public 
Charter School  
Graduates Enrolled in 
College One Year Post-
Graduation 
Rate of DC Public 
Charter School  
Graduates Enrolled in 
College One Year 
Post-Graduation 
2014 986 639 64.8% 
2015 1,087 673 61.9% 
                                               
10 National Center for Education Statistics, “Fast Facts: High School Graduation Rates,” accessed February 
19, 2019, https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=805.  
11 OSSE, “2017-18 Adjusted Cohort Graduation Rate,” November 9, 2018, 
https://osse.dc.gov/publication/2017-18-adjusted-cohort-graduation-rate.  
12 National Center for Education Statistics, “Fast Facts: Dropout Rates,” accessed February 19, 2019, 
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=16.  
13 DC PCSB, “HS 2017-18 PMF Task Force Meeting: College Entrance and Persistence,” August 8, 2017, 
https://dcpcsb.egnyte.com/dl/xtdI5WOrhV/.  
14 DC PCSB, “HS 2017-18 PMF Task Force Meeting: College Entrance and Persistence.” 
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Year Number of DC 
Public Charter 
School Graduates 
Number of DC Public 
Charter School  
Graduates Enrolled in 
College One Year Post-
Graduation 
Rate of DC Public 
Charter School  
Graduates Enrolled in 
College One Year 
Post-Graduation 
2016 1,167 696 59.6% 
 
The data show that the rate of DC charter graduates enrolling in college or university one 
year after completing high school is declining. The rate of students persisting (i.e., 
enrolling in college or university two years after graduating from high school) is also on 
the decline.15 The ability to enroll and persist in college requires students’ financial 
investment, which, given the cost of higher education, can be daunting.16 However, these 
rates also suggest students are exiting DC public charter schools without the skills needed 
to succeed in college, and imply schools are not providing their students with adequate 
college-going resources (e.g., robust advising, financial planning support). The 
Washington, DC job market is saturated with careers that require post-secondary 
education.17 Fewer than half of DC charter graduates are persisting in higher education, 
which means fewer than half of DC charter graduates are prepared for their city’s job 
market. The majority of DC public charter high schools’ mission is to prepare their 
students for college and career success; evidently, they are not fulfilling their mission.  
As publicly funded entities, public charter schools are obligated to provide their 
students with high-quality educational services. Standardized assessment data suggest at 
least half of DC public charter students are matriculating through the system with subpar 
literacy and numeracy skills. Graduation, dropout, and college enrollment rates for DC 
                                               
15 Ibid.  
16 Still, Washington, DC offers tuition subsidies to support its students’ post-secondary pathways.  
17 DC Workforce Investment Council, “Workforce Innovation & Opportunity Act (WIOA) 2016-2020 
Unified State Plan Modification,” April 13, 2018, https://dcworks.dc.gov/node/1323536.  
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public charter students suggest the District’s charter sector is not providing its pupils with 
adequate educational services. This is a problem on its own that is exacerbated when one 
considers the amount of money the city invests in its schools. Each year, the District 
spends an average of $20,000 per student, a funding rate that is higher than the per pupil 
spending allotment in all but two states.18 A return on investment analysis comparing 
student outcomes to education spending would likely reveal an inefficient use of funds. 
Improved public charter school programming (in which students exit the system prepared 
for college and career) would also improve the city’s financial efficiency.   
Despite evidence the District’s public charter high schools are not sufficiently 
serving their students, DC PCSB ranked half of the public charter high schools in its 
portfolio as high-performing in its most recent School Quality Report.19 As a government 
agency and the sole overseer of the District’s public charter schools, DC PCSB has a 
responsibility to the public to adequately assess its schools’ performance. The agency’s 
academic accountability policy (known as the Performance Management Framework), 
which forms the basis of the School Quality Report, fails to capture the sector’s academic 
weaknesses appropriately. If it did, fewer schools would be identified as high-performing. 
III. History/Background 
 
Josephine Baker, DC PCSB’s founding Board Chair and former Executive 
Director, characterized the District’s charter movement was a “desperate response to the 
                                               
18 US Census Bureau, “States Leading Per Student Spending,” June 2017, 
https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/2017/comm/cb17-97-public-education-finance.html.  




traditional school system’s decades-long decline.”20 Children in Crisis, a 1996 report by 
the DC Financial Control Board,21 provided an extensive review of the traditional school 
system’s decline and failure to “teach its pupils even the basics of education.”22 Much 
like the analysis presented in the above “Statement of the Problem” section, the Financial 
Control Board cited a series of indicators (e.g., falling reading and math proficiency 
scores, high dropout rates, and low graduation rates) and conditions (e.g., the 
preponderance of violent behaviors in schools and the inefficient use of per pupil 
funding) to demonstrate weaknesses within District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS), 
the traditional school system. 23 The report’s standout conclusion, that “for each 
additional year that students stay in DCPS, the less likely they are to succeed…because 
the system does not prepare them to succeed,” affirmed local and national leaders’ calls 
to reform DC schools.24  
One such national leader is Newt Gingrich, the Speaker of the United States 
House of Representatives from 1995-1999. Per Baker, Gingrich “was determined 
to…assert his power over the city,” and he expressed an aggressive desire to overhaul the 
District’s school system.25 During his first year as Speaker, Gingrich commissioned a 
task force on DC school reform and sought improvement plans from the DC Board of 
Education. Concurrently, the Council of the District of Columbia (DC Council) held its 
own school reform hearings, soliciting input from DC school leaders and community 
                                               
20 Josephine Baker, The Evolution & Revolution of DC Charter Schools (Washington, DC: Josephine 
Baker, 2014), 1. 
21 The DC Financial Control Board is a now defunct financial oversight committee that was established in 
1995 by the United States Congress in response to DC’s lowly economic status. 
22 DC Financial Control Board, Children in Crisis: The Failure of Public Education in the District, 
November 12, 1996, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/library/dc/control/part2.htm.  
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Baker, 23.  
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advocates. Some school reform planners recommended establishing a public charter 
school sector in the District to create an alternative to the struggling DCPS system. 
In the summer of 1995, the DC Council approved the DC Charter Schools Act to 
establish public charter schools. DC Mayor Marion Berry signed the Act into law and 
sent the legislation to the United States Congress for approval. Around the same time, 
Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton, the District’s non-voting member in the US House of 
Representatives, pressed Gingrich to drop his quest to establish a school voucher system 
in DC, one the primary school reform efforts Gingrich championed.26 Norton encouraged 
Gingrich to “defer to the already existing fledgling charter school system that had been 
created by the District.”27 Instead of approving the DC Charter Schools Act, the United 
States Congress passed the School Reform Act (SRA) in the spring of 1996, and 
President Bill Clinton signed it into law.  
The SRA called for the creation of DC PCSB, a seven-person board whose 
members are appointed by the mayor and approved by DC Council. DC PCSB is an 
independent government agency authorized to perform the following functions: approve 
or deny petitions for public charter schools, monitor public charter schools’ operational 
performance, ensure public charter schools’ compliance with applicable law, and monitor 
public charter schools’ progress in meeting student academic achievement goals.  
Per the SRA, schools that do not meet their student academic achievement goals 
may lose their charter. John “Skip” McKoy, a former DC PCSB Board Chair, was critical 
of schools’ academic achievement goals, saying “many of the goals were apple pie and 
                                               
26 Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton, “Norton Says D.C.’s Home-Rule Alternative to DCPS is Charter 
Schools, Not Private School Vouchers,” May 13, 2015, https://norton.house.gov/media-center/press-
releases/norton-says-dc-s-home-rule-alternative-to-dcps-is-charter-schools-not.  
27 Ibid.  
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fluff.”28 Other board members and staff agreed with McKoy’s characterization; they 
found many schools’ goals too weak (i.e., neither specific nor measurable) to assess 
academic performance adequately. 
As a result, in 2008, the Board asked DC PCSB staff to create a tool to evaluate 
school performance. The tool, known as the Performance Management Framework 
(PMF), was not designed to replace schools’ goals (though many schools have adopted 
the PMF as their student academic achievement goals); rather, the PMF was created to 
supplement the evaluation practices the agency already employed.  As written in the 2009 
DC PCSB Annual Report, the Board expected the policy to  
improve PCSB’s ability to define high, medium and low-performing standards, 
and to clearly communicate the expectations, rewards, and consequences to 
schools, families, and communities. It will enable the PCSB to make clear 
judgments about school performance and better manage the portfolio of public 
charter school offerings. The overarching objective is to drive high-achieving 
schools to full potential, mediocre schools to high-achieving levels, and to 
eliminate low-performing schools so that D.C. students and families have a 
diversity of high quality public school options from which to choose.29 
With financial support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, DC PCSB 
convened a working group in which the Board’s staff collaborated with researchers, 
school leaders, and other stakeholders to develop a set of academic performance 
                                               
28 David Osborne, Reinventing America’s Schools, (New York: Bloomsbury USA, 2017), 93. 
29 DC PCSB, Annual Report 2009, accessed March 6, 2019, 
https://www.dcpcsb.org/sites/default/files/report/2009%20Annual%20Report%20%281%29.pdf, 10.  
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indicators for elementary, middle, and high schools. 30 After months of policy 
development, DC PCSB staff codified the evaluation tool, asking the Board to approve 
the first PMF Policy and Technical Guide (PMF Policy). Though school leaders 
participated in the policy’s creation, many were apprehensive about its implementation.31 
As a result, DC PCSB staff agreed to pilot the framework with a limited number of 
schools during school year 2008-2009. At the end of school year 2009-2010, DC PCSB 
implemented the framework, applying it to all PK-3 through 12th grade-serving public 
charter schools. 32 DC PCSB has produced its School Quality Report (the vehicle for 
reporting PMF data) every year since 2010.33  
The PMF includes the High School framework (HS PMF). The HS PMF 
comprises four categories, which are summarized in the table below.  
Table 4. PMF Category Descriptions34 
PMF Category Description 
Student Progress This category reports students’ year-to-year growth in ELA 
and math on the PARCC. 
Student 
Achievement 
This category reports students’ PARCC ELA and math 
proficiency. 
Gateway This category reports students’ college and career readiness. It 
includes measures such as 4-year graduation rate, college 
acceptance rate, and SAT/ACT performance rate.35 
School Environment This category reports student attendance and re-enrollment 
rates. 
                                               
30 Baker, 88. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Since then, DC PCSB expanded its PMF Policy to include an evaluation of adult and alternative school 
performance. However, as previously noted, this proposal focuses on high school performance. 
33 DC PCSB, “School Quality Reports,” accessed March 20, 2019, https://www.dcpcsb.org/schoolquality.  
34 DC PCSB, 2018-19 Performance Management Framework Policy and Technical Guide, November 8, 
2018, https://dcpcsb.egnyte.com/dl/sK7g1OPLmH/, 56. 
35 Ibid., 21. 
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Each category has a set of measures (i.e., a series of performance indicators) and 
metrics (i.e., the “calculation method… for a given measure”).36 DC PCSB scores 
schools’ performance by assigning “each measure…a “weight,” which is the maximum 
possible points that can be awarded for that measure.”37 The total number of points 
possible is 100. Schools that earn 65 points or more are identified as high-performing. 
Schools that earn between 64.9 points and 35 points are identified as mid-performing. 
Schools that earn fewer than 35 points are identified as low-performing. High-performing 
schools are “generally exempt” from site reviews, and are encouraged to expand to 
educate more students.38 Low-performing schools must undergo site reviews. 
Additionally, low-performing schools may be subject to a high-stakes review in which 
the Board considers charter revocation.39   
Per DC PCSB’s Deputy Director, Naomi DeVeaux, “the rating system is designed 
to get tougher each year so that schools must improve their performance in order to earn 
the same score.”40 To that end, every year, DC PCSB staff host task force meetings 
involving stakeholders (e.g., school leaders, public charter school advocates, researchers, 
assessment experts) to discuss ways to adjust or set new PMF Policy measures. DC 
PCSB staff ask school leaders to vote for or against proposed PMF Policy modifications. 
Typically, DC PCSB staff recommend the Board approve PMF modifications “when two-
thirds of the task force votes in favor of a revision.”41 Less frequently, DC PCSB staff 
                                               
36 Ibid., 8. 
37 Ibid., 9.  
38 Ibid., 7.  
39 Ibid.  
40 Emma Brown, “D.C. Charter Board Releases School Ratings,” The Washington Post, November 7, 2012, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/dc-charter-board-releases-school-
ratings/2012/11/07/05ef81ba-2908-11e2-96b6-8e6a7524553f_story.html?utm_term=.1921ad391e88.  
41 DC PCSB, “2018-19 Adult Education PMF Policy & Technical Guide, 
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encourage the Board to approve a “change contrary to the task force members’ 
recommendation.”42  
IV. Policy Proposal 
 The goal of this proposal is to modify DC PCSB’s PMF Policy so no more than a 
quarter of public charter high schools are ranked Tier 1 (i.e., high-performing).  The 
proposed PMF Policy modifications are devised to more accurately report academic 
performance among DC public charter high schools, thereby improving DC PCSB’s 
ability to identify and respond to school deficiencies. Implementing this proposal should 
also increase public charter school leaders’ ability to recognize and address program 
weaknesses. Combined, these modifications may lead to better academic outcomes for 
Washington, DC’s public charter high school students. The policy authorization tool is an 
amendment to the PMF Policy,43 to be implemented school year 2020-2021. Specific 
PMF Policy revisions are summarized below. 
Category: Student Achievement 
Measures: 1.) Approaching PARCC Expectations and above in ELA (PARCC ELA 3+), 
2.) Approaching PARCC Expectations and above in Math (PARCC Math 3+), 3.) 
Meeting or Exceeding PARCC Expectations in ELA (PARCC ELA 4+), 4.) Meeting or 
Exceeding PARCC Expectations in Math (PARCC Math 4+) 
                                               
Open for Public Comment,” June 29, 2018, http://www.livebinders.com/media/get/MTc5NjE0NzI=. 
42 Ibid.  
43 DC PCSB, 2018-19 Performance Management Framework Policy and Technical Guide.  
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Current Policy: The Student Achievement category reports the percent of students who 
are approaching, meeting, and exceeding expectations PARCC ELA and math. A level 
three on the PARCC indicates a student is approaching expectations, a level four 
indicates a student is meeting expectations in the tested subject, and a level five indicates 
a student is exceeding expectations. Under the HS PMF, schools can earn as many points 
when students score a level three on the PARCC as they can earn when students score a 
level four or five. Each measure has a floor (the minimum rate a school must earn to start 
earning points) and a target (the maximum rate a school can earn to achieve all of a 
measure’s points).44 In the current PMF Policy, the floors for the Student Achievement 
measures are set at the 10th percentile of DC public charter high school PARCC 
performance. Two of the Student Achievement targets are set at an “aspirational” 100.45 
The other two Student Achievement targets are set at the 90th percentile of DC public 
charter high school PARCC performance.46 
Proposed Amendment: Award public charter high schools more points when their 
students score a level four or five on the PARCC than when their students score a level 
three on the PARCC. Additionally, set rigorous floors (e.g., 60.0-80.0) and ambitious 
targets (e.g., 90.0-100) for all Student Achievement measures. See the table below for 
details. 
                                               
44 Ibid.  




Table 5. PMF Policy Proposal for Student Achievement 
 
Category: Gateway  
Measures: 1.) Four-Year Graduation Rate, 2.) Five-Year Graduation Rate  
Current Provision: The Graduation Rate measures report the percentage of public 
charter school students who graduate in four or five years.47 Under the current PMF 
Policy, schools can earn more points when students graduate in five years than when 
students graduate in four years. Specifically, schools can earn up to six points for their 
five-year graduation rate compared to four points for their four-year graduation rate. 
Proposed Amendment: Award more points to schools when public charter high school 
students graduate in four years than when students graduate in five years. See the table 
below for details. 
 
                                               
47 Ibid., 61. 

























ELA 4+ 5.0 8.0 7.7 60.0 39.2 90.0 
PARCC 
Math 4+ 5.0 8.0 0.0 60.0 12.6 90.0 
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Table 6. PMF Policy Proposal for Gateway – Graduation Rates 




Gateway Four-Year Graduation 
Rate 
4.0 6.0 




Category: Gateway  
Measure: College Acceptance 
Current Provision: The College Acceptance measure reports the rate of graduating 
public charter school students who were accepted into a two- or four-year college.48 
Proposed Amendment: Reduce the number of points schools can earn for this measure. 
See the table below for details. 
Table 7. PMF Policy Proposal for Gateway – College Acceptance 








                                               




Measure: College Enrollment (new) 
Proposed Amendment: Add a measure to the Gateway category that reports the rate of 
public charter high school graduates from the prior school year who were 1.) positively 
counted in the College Acceptance measure and 2.) enrolled in a two- or four-year 
college the following school year. See the table below for details. 
Table 8. PMF Policy Proposal for Gateway – College Enrollment 




Gateway College Enrollment 0 3.0 
 
To implement this proposal, DC PCSB’s data manager will have to reconfigure 
portions of the agency’s data system. Additionally, the Financial and Academic Quality 
team (the individuals who develop the PMF Policy and produce the School Quality 
Report), will have to expand their data collection and validation process. While DC 
PCSB staff will be responsible for adjusting the data system and adopting new processes 
to support policy implementation, these modifications will not incur fees beyond that 
which the agency has already budgeted. (As noted in the “History/Background” section, 
DC PCSB amends its PMF Policy on an almost annual basis; the agency’s budget already 
reflects the costs that are associated with PMF Policy revision.)  
While DC PCSB will not spend additional funds to implement this proposal, as 
described further in the “Political Analysis” section of this memorandum, it is probable 
public charter high schools will adjust their spending plans in response to the revised 
17 
 
expectations. This amendment will motivate schools to change their programming (e.g., 
instructional methods, staffing plans) and processes (e.g., data and document collection, 
retention, and reporting). Schools may need to re-allocate funds to accommodate program 
and process adjustments. Public charter high school leaders may claim this proposal will 
require additional funding from the District’s education budget. It is not clear whether 
additional expenditures are genuinely needed (again, the city already spends some 
$20,000 per student; this rate is higher than all but two states’ per pupil spending 
levels).49 Furthermore, if additional funding is necessary, it is difficult to project how 
much funding this proposal will incur because there is considerable variation between 
school spending plans.  
V. Policy Analysis 
This policy proposal fulfills its goal: it reduces the percent of public charter high 
schools that are ranked Tier 1 such that fewer than a quarter of schools are rated high-
performing. This determination is based on simulations using actual PMF data from the 
past two school years. The simulations were completed by inputting the PMF rates from 
school years 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 into a modified version of DC PCSB’s HS PMF 
Calculator.50,51 It is important to note the simulation does not include the proposed 
College Enrollment measure; it is not possible to include this measure in the simulation 
because the underlying data are not publicly available. See the Appendix to review the 
simulation results for each high school. 
                                               
49 US Census Bureau, “States Leading Per Student Spending,” June 2017, 
https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/2017/comm/cb17-97-public-education-finance.html. 
50 DC PCSB, “Performance Management Framework (PMF) Calculators,” accessed April 4, 2019, 
https://www.dcpcsb.org/performance-management-framework-pmf/performance-management-framework-
pmf-calculators.    
51 DC PCSB, “School Quality Reports,” accessed March 20, 2019, https://www.dcpcsb.org/schoolquality. 
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The table below shows the published PMF scores and tiers public charter high 
schools earned during school year 2016-2017.52 It also shows the simulated scores and 
tiers public charter high schools would have earned had the proposed policy been in 
effect. There is an additional table summarizing the official school year 2016-2017 tier 
rankings compared to tier rankings schools would have received had the proposed policy 
been in effect.  
Table 9. Simulated PMF Policy Proposal Based on School Year 2016-2017 Data  
 
 
                                               
52 The public charter high schools included in this simulation are those that had a publicly available score 
and tier in both 2016-2017 and 2017-2018. Sixteen of 19 public charter high schools met these conditions. 
In the tables, these 16 schools are lettered instead of being listed by name.  





















School A 42.7 26.8 -15.9 2 3 Yes 
School B 67.2 53.7 -13.5 1 2 Yes 
School C 66.1 61.8 -4.3 1 2 Yes 
School D 95.5 81.0 -14.5 1 1 No 
School E 62.7 47.3 -15.4 2 2 No 
School F 65.3 56.1 -9.2 1 2 Yes 
School G 89.1 75.2 -13.9 1 1 No 
School H 27.9 16.5 -11.4 3 3 No 
School I 52.2 47.2 -5.0 2 2 No 
School J 53.6 52.4 -1.2 2 2 No 
School K 50.1 44.6 -5.5 2 2 No 
School L 44.0 40.0 -4.0 2 2 No 
School M 41.5 31.1 -10.4 2 3 Yes 
School N 54.5 52.3 -2.2 2 2 No 
School O 48.5 40.1 -8.4 2 2 No 
School P 66.5 52.7 -13.8 1 2 Yes 
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Table 10. Simulated PMF Policy Proposal Summary Based on School Year 2016-2017 
Data 
 Simulation Summary Based on School Year 2016-2017 Data  
PMF Ranking Count Under Current  
PMF Policy  
(% of the Public Charter 
High School Sector) 
Count Under Proposed 
PMF Policy  
(% of the Public Charter 
High School Sector) 
Tier 1 (High-Performing)   6 (38%) 2 (13%) 
Tier 2 (Mid-Performing)  9 (56%) 11 (69%) 
Tier 3 (Low-Performing)  1 (6%) 3 (19%) 
 
Under the proposed policy, no more than a quarter of public charter high schools are 
ranked Tier 1, due largely to the increase in public charter high schools that are ranked 
Tier 2. Had this proposal been in effect during school year 2016-2017, two additional 
public charter high schools would have been flagged as Tier 3 (i.e., low-performing) 
schools. (As the table above shows, only one public charter high school was identified as 
low-performing in school year 2016-2017.) Had Schools A and M been identified as low-
performing in school year 2016-2017, DC PCSB staff would have conducted on-site 
instructional observations and provided those schools’ leaders with a detailed assessment 
of school performance.53 DC PCSB may have also held formal meetings with leaders 
from Schools A and M to discuss performance concerns. The agency might have 
considered initiating a high-stakes review for Schools A and M.  
The table below shows the published PMF scores and tiers public charter high 
schools earned during school year 2017-2018 along with the simulated scores and tiers. 
There is an additional table summarizing the official school year 2017-2018 tier rankings 
                                               
53 Per the PMF Policy, schools that are ranked Tier 3 are subject to a Quality Site Review the following 
school year.  
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compared to the tier rankings schools would have received had the proposed policy been 
in effect. 
Table 11. Simulated PMF Policy Proposal Based on School Year 2017-2018 Data 





















School A 47.1 35.9 -11.2 2 2 No 
School B 75.5 59.4 -16.1 1 2 Yes 
School C 65.4 57.2 -8.2 1 2 Yes 
School D 97.3 80.7 -16.6 1 1 No 
School E 66.8 62.3 -4.5 1 2 Yes 
School F 83.6 70.7 -12.9 1 1 No 
School G 93.4 80.8 -12.6 1 1 No 
School H 26.7 20.4 -6.3 3 3 No 
School I 59.8 51.1 -8.7 2 2 No 
School J 51.9 47.1 -4.8 2 2 No 
School K 52.8 44.7 -8.1 2 2 No 
School L 49.6 46.6 -3.0 2 2 No 
School M 50.4 44.2 -6.2 2 2 No 
School N 77.9 60.4 -17.5 1 2 Yes 
School O 50.9 40.9 -10.0 2 2 No 
School P 68.1 55.4 -12.7 1 2 Yes 
 
Table 12. Simulated PMF Policy Proposal Summary Based on School Year 2017-2018 
Data 
 
 Simulation Summary for School Year 2017-2018  
PMF Ranking Count Under Current  
PMF Policy  
(% of the Public Charter 
High School Sector) 
Count Under Proposed 
PMF Policy  
(% of the Public Charter 
High School Sector) 
Tier 1 (High-Performing)   8 (50%) 3 (19%) 
Tier 2 (Mid-Performing)  7 (44%) 12 (75%) 
Tier 3 (Low-Performing)  1 (6%) 1 (6%) 
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As with the school year 2016-2017 simulation, the proportion of Tier 1 schools declines 
(falling from 50 percent to 19 percent). Unlike the 2016-2017 simulation, no additional 
schools were ranked Tier 3; however, the policy’s goal was not necessarily to identify 
more Tier 3 schools.  
This policy proposal sets higher performance expectations than the currently 
approved PMF Policy, which, in the long run, could lead to better student outcomes. The 
revised policy gives schools more points when their students attain PARCC proficiency. 
(Recall, in the current PMF Policy, schools can earn as many points when students score 
a level three on the PARCC as they can earn when students score a level four or five.) 
Since the District adopted PARCC as its official assessment in school year 2014-2015, 
DCPS has evaluated its students’ performance using scores of four (meeting 
expectations) and five (exceeding expectations) as the barometer for achievement.54 By 
contrast, DC PCSB includes a score of three (approaching expectations) in its barometer 
for achievement. This evaluation disparity may explain, at least in part, why DCPS 
outperformed public charter schools on the PARCC exam for the past two school years.55 
DCPS set a higher standard, and their educators are working to meet that standard. DC 
PCSB set a more attainable standard, and, perhaps as a consequence, public charter 
schools are not performing as well on the state assessment as DCPS. To be clear, public 
charter school educators are working as hard as their DCPS counterparts. However, their 
target is lower, which means they are employing instructional and programmatic 
approaches aimed at different (i.e., less rigorous) targets. As education economists David 
                                               
54 DCPS, “DC Public Schools PARCC Scores Released for High School Students,” October 27, 2015, 
https://dcps.dc.gov/node/1120832. 
55 OSSE, “DC's 2018 PARCC Results.” 
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Figlio and Susanna Loeb write, “measuring and reporting school performance…provides 
incentives that encourage educators to concentrate on the subjects and materials that are 
being measured and to potentially alter the methods through which they educate 
students.”56 Adjusting DC PCSB’s public charter high school accountability policy could 
result in more effective instructional practices, which may yield improved student 
performance.  
 This proposal directs more attention to college preparation than the current PMF 
policy does. The amended policy is apt to motivate school leaders to refine their 
instructional methods and college placement strategies. Some public charter high schools 
already offer robust college planning supports.57 Per the DC public charter college 
matriculation data referenced in the “Statement of Problem” section of this memorandum, 
evidently, many public charter high schools are not providing their students with 
sufficient college planning supports. The addition of a College Enrollment measure 
incentivizes public charter high schools’ investment in their college counseling 
programming. It also provides the public with more information about how successful 
public charter high schools are in preparing graduates for higher education. This is 
valuable information parents and students would benefit from using as they exercise 
school choice. 
Despite these pros, this policy proposal has pronounced cons. For example, the 
amended PMF Policy may result in fewer parents enrolling their children in the District’s 
public charter high schools. Parents may lose confidence in the public charter sector if 
                                               
56 David Figlio and Susanna Loeb, “School Accountability,” in Handbook of the Economics of Education: 
Volume 3, eds. Eric Hanushek and Finis Welch (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2006), 387. 




fewer schools are identified as high-performers. If enrollment falls at DC public charter 
high schools, many of those students will likely enroll in the traditional school system. If 
this happens, DCPS may be overwhelmed by the influx of students, which would 
impinge on their ability to serve the students who are already enrolled in their high 
schools. If a particularly large portion of students withdraws from public charter high 
schools, those schools may be at risk of closure. For example, when public charter 
schools lose a sizeable number of students, they become programmatically and 
financially unsustainable, forcing school leaders to consider school closure. While 
diminished enrollment is possible, it is not inevitable. Of the seven public charter schools 
that were rated low-performing in school year 2017-2018, four saw increased enrollment 
counts the following school year, and only three saw enrollment decreases.58,59  
Another consequence of diminishing enrollment is that DC PCSB’s budget will 
shrink. DC PCSB levies an administrative fee against the public charter schools in its 
portfolio; this is “DC PCSB’s primary source of revenue.”60 The amount a school must 
render is based on its enrollment; the greater the student population, the greater the 
administrative fee. If this policy spurred an enrollment decline, DC PCSB’s budget would 
decrease, and the agency could face operational challenges that could inhibit its school 
oversight capacity. Again, while this outcome is possible, it is not probable given public 
charter schools’ historical ability to attract students despite Tier 3 PMF status.  
Academic Richard Rothstein posits some general criticisms of school 
accountability plans, particularly when they are primarily focused on students’ 
                                               
58 DC PCSB, “School Quality Reports,” accessed March 20, 2019, https://www.dcpcsb.org/schoolquality. 
59 OSSE, “Enrollment Audit Data,” accessed April 22, 2019, https://osse.dc.gov/enrollment.  




standardized test performance. His contributions are worth considering because the PMF 
Policy (both its current iteration and the proposed amendment) are reliant on PARCC 
scores. In Grading Education, Rothstein discusses the challenges disadvantaged children 
experience such as hunger, health conditions, crime, and parents who do not have the 
capacity to support their learning.61 He writes “test-based accountability will erode 
support for public education.” 62 Rothstein’s rationale for this erosion is that educators 
will claim they can close the achievement gap, a feat that is “impossible” given students’ 
life challenges.63 Per Rothstein, “when these educators fail to fulfill the impossible 
expectations, they themselves have endorsed, the reasonable conclusion can only be that 
they and their colleagues in public education are hopelessly incompetent.”64 The scholar 
goes on to argue that proficiency-based accountability systems that are not accompanied 
by extensive anti-poverty investment are not worth pursuit. 
VI. Political Analysis 
 As DC PCSB’s Executive Director, your primary stakeholders are the agency’s 
board members: Chair Rick Cruz, Vice Chair Saba Bireda, Steve Bumbaugh, Lea Crusey, 
Ricarda Ganjam, and Naomi Shelton. All of the board members support the PMF Policy 
and the agency’s reliance on the Framework for assessing school quality. None of the 
current board members are on record speaking about the kind of modifications that are 
included in this proposal. However, former Board Chair Darren Woodruff spoke publicly 
about adding college enrollment data to the PMF Policy. Specifically, in June 2017, 
Woodruff  “requested that college entrance and persistence be included on the 2017-18 
                                               
61 Richard Rothstein, Rebecca Jacobsen, and Tamara Wilder, Grading Education: Getting Accountability 
Right (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 2008), 70.  
62 Ibid., 71. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid.  
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HS PMF.”65 Of course, Woodruff is no longer on the Board; it is not clear whether 
current members also hold this interest. That said, for at least the past four years, the 
Board has affirmed every PMF Policy amendment as recommended by DC PCSB staff. 
The Board’s consistent affirmation signals confidence in DC PCSB staff. If DC PCSB 
staff support this policy proposal, the Board is apt to vote in favor of the amendment. 
 Unlike the Board, public charter high school leaders will not support the policy 
proposal. In general, school leaders will not support a PMF Policy amendment that makes 
achieving a Tier 1 ranking more difficult. More specifically, there is clear evidence 
school leaders will not support adding college-going measures to the PMF Policy. In 
August 2017, DC PCSB staff met with the HS PMF Task Force to determine how to 
report college enrollment and persistence “information as a display-only measure on the 
2017-18 scorecard.”66 A display-only measure is one that is shown on the School Quality 
Report (for the public’s interest) though the data are not factored into schools’ score or 
tier. Representatives from eight public charter high schools attended the meeting.67 (In 
other words, half of the District’s public charter high schools participated in the meeting.) 
Per the meeting notes and a summary of school leaders’ comments on the proposal, not a 
single public charter high school leader supported publishing college enrollment data on 
the School Quality Report.68,69 
School leaders voiced operational and philosophical concerns regarding 
displaying college enrollment data on the School Quality Report. Many school leaders 
                                               
65 DC PCSB, “HS 2017-18 PMF Task Force Meeting: College Entrance and Persistence,” August 8, 2017, 
https://dcpcsb.egnyte.com/dl/xtdI5WOrhV/, 4.  
66 Ibid. 
67 DC PCSB, PMF HS Task Force Meeting, August 8, 2017, https://dcpcsb.egnyte.com/dl/b0KRlNEYm6/.  
68 Ibid.  
69 DC PCSB, Summary of School Leader Comments Regarding College Entrance and Persistence Display 
Measures, August 21, 2017, https://dcpcsb.egnyte.com/dl/Gy0d15NCvx/. 
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said displaying the information would create an “administrative burden” for their college 
counseling and data management teams (e.g., this change would require school staff to 
track, collect, report, and share additional data and supporting documents).70 Some school 
leaders highlighted the financial implications associated with adding college enrollment 
and persistence measures to the PMF report. For example, in a letter to former Board 
Chair Darren Woodruff,  a public charter high school executive director wrote that her 
school budgets nearly $400,000 each year to operate a “College Office” that provides 
students with college-going assistance.71 In the letter, the executive director said the 
school funds “activities to support our alumni entirely through private philanthropy, not 
through public dollars.”72 This demonstrates a perceived or actual need for additional 
funding to support graduates’ post-secondary pursuits.  
Other school leaders made philosophical arguments against displaying college 
enrollment and persistence information. For example, one school leader wrote to DC 
PCSB arguing the “Board should recognize that not all students wish to attend colleges or 
continue post-secondary education. The Board should…not impose additional values on 
students and families that may have different plans or goals.”73 Another head of school 
wrote to DC PCSB staff, “[w]hile we care deeply about our students being college ready 
and we work hard to support their acceptance to and enrollment in the colleges…we have 
learned from experience that college matriculation and persistence are often beyond our 
locus of control.”74 This statement alludes to the societal conditions (i.e., poverty) that 
                                               
70 DC PCSB, PMF HS Task Force Meeting, 1.  
71 Hilary Darilek to Darren Woodruff, July 19, 2017, https://dcpcsb.egnyte.com/dl/euonDCZgWV/.  
72 Ibid.  
73 Richard Pohlman to DC PCSB, July 14, 2017, https://dcpcsb.egnyte.com/dl/7rhfqyCWSN/.  




create a blockade to college enrollment for many DC graduates. While quality 
educational programming is a critical part of poverty mitigation, high-performing schools 
can’t solve poverty alone. As long as poverty persists, students will continue to 
experience barriers to college enrollment—barriers schools will have difficulty helping 
their graduates overcome.  
 Public charter high school leaders’ opposition to displaying college-going metrics 
on the School Quality Report will only grow stronger with the prospect of adding a 
college enrollment measure to the PMF Policy that counts towards schools’ score and 
tier. Though the current proposal does not include reporting college persistence as DC 
PCSB staff suggested in August 2017, it is unlikely school leaders will embrace the 
change. After all, the concerns and challenges they described in 2017 persist under the 
current PMF Policy proposal.  
Public charter high school leaders will have an ally in Friends of Choice in Urban 
Schools (FOCUS), another stakeholder. FOCUS is a non-profit public charter school 
advocacy organization. DC PCSB staff enjoy a friendly relationship with FOCUS, and 
the organizations rarely take divergent policy positions.75 However, FOCUS’ chief aim is 
protecting DC public charter schools’ interests, which occasionally propels FOCUS to 
reject DC PCSB policy.76 The advocacy organization may argue this PMF Policy 
proposal is an overreach that sets unreasonable targets for public charter high schools. 
Even if FOCUS does not make such an argument publicly, they are apt to mobilize public 
charter high schools behind the scenes, helping school administrators to present a united 
front against the proposal.  
                                               
75 In fact, DC PCSB’s Deputy Director is a former FOCUS employee. 
76 FOCUS, “About Us,” accessed April 18, 2019, https://focusdc.org/about-us.  
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Parents of current and prospective public charter high school students are yet 
another stakeholder. Parents rarely advocate for or against PMF Policy amendment 
proposals. The last time they did was in 2013 when DC PCSB staff proposed adding 
early childhood accountability measures to the Framework.77 Since then, parents have 
been largely silent on PMF Policy revisions. While they do not engage in PMF Policy 
amendment conversations, parents rely on PMF data to inform their school application 
and enrollment choices. A cursory review of DC Urban Moms and Dads (an anonymous 
web forum for DC parents) reveals parents scrutinize DC PCSB’s School Quality Report, 
paying special attention to schools’ tier status.78 It is reasonable to assume that parents 
will support the policy proposal because the amendment will increase transparency, 
thereby improving parents’ ability to identify which public charter high schools are 
operating optimal programs. 
The Washington Teachers Union (WTU) is not an obvious stakeholder, given the 
lack of unionized public charter schools in the District. Nevertheless, WTU has been 
critical of the public charter sector, and they were particularly vocal when a DC public 
charter school suddenly announced it is closing its only unionized campus.79 It is unlikely 
WTU will express support for or against the PMF Policy proposal; however, if the Board 
approves the policy, WTU may leverage the subsequent performance data to advance an 
                                               
77 Michael Alison Chandler, “D.C. Charter Board asked to Reconsider Preschool Ranking Plan,” The 
Washington Post, September 11, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/dc-charter-board-
asked-to-reconsider-preschool-ranking-plan/2013/09/11/245991de-1af4-11e3-8685-
5021e0c41964_story.html?utm_term=.14087aa82a10. 
78 DC Urban Moms and Dads, “I Just Scooped the DCPCSB – 2018 Tiers,” October 30, 2018, 
https://www.dcurbanmom.com/jforum/posts/list/762002.page.  
79 Perry Stein, “D.C.’s Only Unionized Charter School Filed Another Federal Labor Complaint — this 






anti-charter agenda. If the proposal is approved and implemented, public charter high 
schools’ PMF scores will decrease, and fewer schools will be ranked Tier 1. The WTU 
(and other public charter school critics) will almost surely seize on evidence that public 
charter schools are underperforming. This could embolden their narrative that DCPS 
should be the sole public education provider in the District. 
The final set of stakeholders are DC PCSB’s partners in education: the Office of 
the Deputy Mayor for Education (DME), DC Council’s Committee on Education 
(Education Committee), and OSSE. The DME and the Education Committee do not 
typically weigh in on DC PCSB’s academic accountability policies. DC PCSB is an 
independent government agency; as a result, DME and the Education Committee seem to 
defer to DC PCSB on public charter school issues. While OSSE also does not comment 
publicly on DC PCSB policy, it may take an interest in this particular proposal. In 
December 2018, OSSE released its School Transparency and Reporting (STAR) rating 
system, an academic and non-academic evaluation tool for both DCPS and DC public 
charter schools. OSSE will publish STAR performance reports on an annual basis in 
compliance with the Every Student Succeeds Act, a federal law that requires state 
education agencies to produce accountability frameworks. There is considerable overlap 
between OSSE’s STAR system and DC PCSB’s PMF. While DC PCSB is committed to 
producing the PMF, the agency has not articulated plans to significantly adjust the PMF 
Policy. It is difficult to predict how OSSE will react if the Board approves the policy 
proposal. OSSE may privately criticize the policy amendment because it may divert 
attention from the STAR rating system to the PMF. Alternatively, OSSE may privately 
support the amendment, recognizing DC PCSB as the sole agency with public charter 
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school oversight authority. OSSE will also take an interest in the proposal because DC 
PCSB relies on OSSE to provide some of the underlying data required for PMF 
production.  It is worth noting that the proposed policy will not require OSSE to send any 
additional data DC PCSB, which should help data management staff at both agencies 
maintain a healthy working relationship.  
VII. Recommendation 
I recommend approving the policy proposal because it enables DC PCSB to 
better fulfill its responsibilities as the sole authorizer of DC’s public charter schools. 
The public charter school model can be distilled “in mathematical terms: flexibility 
under state education law + autonomy of decision-making by the governing body of the 
school + the highest accountability in public K-12 education = increased student 
achievement.”80 Researchers affirm this theory of action, identifying public charter 
school authorizers as critical actors in creating a “healthier charter sector” in which 
students achieve academic success.81 You demonstrated a commitment to this theory of 
action in 2013 when you said, “the board has [a] “vital role” to ensure that taxpayer-
funded charter schools are high quality.”82 
DC PCSB is responsible for maintaining an academic accountability policy 
that—in tandem with autonomous schools—leads to positive student outcomes. The 
agency’s current academic accountability tool, the PMF Policy, does not set 
                                               
80 Andrew Lewis, “Fulfilling the Charter School Promise: Accountability Matters; So Do Freedom, Fair 
Funding, and Strong Operators,” The 74, March 7, 2018, https://www.the74million.org/article/fulfilling-
the-charter-school-promise-accountability-matters-so-does-freedom-fair-funding-and-strong-operators/.  
81 Emily Peltason and Margaret Raymond, Charter School Growth and Replication: Volume I (Stanford: 
Center for Research on Education Outcomes at Stanford University, 2013), 2. 
82 Michael Alison Chandler, “D.C. Charter Board Asked to Reconsider Preschool Ranking Plan,” The 





performance expectations that are leading to positive student outcomes. Instead, the 
PMF Policy hides public charter high schools’ deficiencies. For example, the 2018 
School Quality Report, which is based off PMF data from school year 2017-2018, 
indicates half of the District’s public charter high schools are high-performing; 
however, during the same period, just over a quarter of public charter high school 
students met or exceeded PARCC ELA expectations, while a mere 12.2 percent of DC 
public charter high school students met or exceeded PARCC math expectations. How can 
DC PCSB reasonably claim its public charter high schools are high-performing when the 
vast majority of students attending these schools are not demonstrating proficiency in 
literacy and numeracy? The PMF Policy results in misleading performance data, thereby 
limiting DC PCSB and school leaders’ ability to identify and respond to programmatic 
weaknesses. DC PCSB is unable to provide its struggling public charter high schools 
with meaningful oversight because the agency’s accountability tool does not identify all 
of the struggling public charter high schools in its portfolio. Approving the proposed 
PMF Policy amendment will improve DC PCSB’s ability to identify schools’ 
weaknesses. As such, school leaders will be better positioned to develop strategies to 
improve their programs to the benefit of public charter high school students.  
If the proposed PMF Policy is enacted, the number of public charter high 
schools classified as high-performing will fall, which will be concerning to some DC 
PCSB stakeholders. DC PCSB’s communications team will have to be proactive in 
crafting a message for parents and community members to help them understand the 
PMF rank changes. The agency’s messaging should focus on the policy proposal’s 
benefits (e.g., more appropriate performance rankings that will aid DC PCSB and 
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school staff in assessing and responding to school needs) and the original vision for the 
PMF Policy (i.e., increasing the Framework’s rigor over time to ensure schools are 
constantly striving to build high-quality schools). 
It is imperative DC PCSB pursue the policy proposal despite school leaders’ 
resistance. To assuage school leaders’ concerns about implementing the policy 
proposal, DC PCSB can pilot the amended PMF Policy at the end of school year 2019-
2020. This will help school leaders identify the operational and programmatic changes 
they need to make to improve their PMF performance before the new policy is enacted 
in school year 2020-2021. DC PCSB will not be able to mollify school leaders fully, 
but the agency can certainly provide schools with supports (e.g., hosting 
communications trainings, sharing best practices in record collection) as it transitions to 
the revised academic accountability policy.  
It is unwise to ignore Richard Rothstein’s criticisms of academic accountability 
systems that rely on standardized test performance. While his argument is largely 
speculative, it is rationally conceived. It is easily fathomable that people will lose 
confidence in public education if accountability systems show schools experiencing 
difficulty closing achievement gaps. Still, how can schools and school authorizers close 
achievement gaps if they do not know they exist? DC PCSB’s academic accountability 
tool must acknowledge school weaknesses, better positioning DC PCSB and school 
staff’s ability to develop strategies to improve educational offerings.  
DC PCSB’s mission is to “provide quality public charter school options for DC 
students, families, and communities,” and its vision is to “lead the transformation of 
public education in DC, and serve as a national role model for charter school authorizing 
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and accountability.”83 The agency has a reputation as being “one of the top charter school 
authorizers in the country.”84 DC PCSB is not a worthwhile model for authorizing nor is 
it worthy of its reputation unless its policies give way to high-performing schools in 
which students achieve positive academic outcomes. Amending the PMF Policy gives the 
agency an opportunity to embrace its mission, playing a vital role in supporting schools’ 
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